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Combining intermediate propositional logics with
classical logic
Steffen Lewitzka ∗
Abstract
In [17], we introduced a modal logic, called L, which combines intuitionistic
propositional logic IPC and classical propositional logic CPC and is complete
w.r.t. an algebraic semantics. However, L seems to be too weak for Kripke-style
semantics. In this paper, we add positive and negative introspection and show
that the resulting logic L5 has a Kripke semantics. For intermediate logics I ,
we consider the parametrized versions L5(I) of L5 where IPC is replaced by
I . L5(I) can be seen as a classical modal logic for the reasoning about truth
in I . From our results, we derive a simple method for determining algebraic and
Kripke semantics for some specific intermediate logics. We discuss some examples
which are of interest for Computer Science, namely the Logic of Here-and-There,
Go¨del-Dummett Logic and Jankov Logic. Our method provides new proofs of
completeness theorems due to Hosoi, Dummett/Horn and Jankov, respectively.
Keywords: intuitionistic logic, intermediate logic, non-Fregean logic, Heyting al-
gebra, Logic of Here-and-There, Go¨del-Dummett Logic, Jankov Logic
1 Introduction
The study of certain modal systems from the perspective of non-Fregean logic seems to
be a promising approach (see e.g. [15, 17, 16, 22, 2]). The basic classical non-Fregean
logic is Suszko’s Sentential Calculus with Identity SCI [2]. SCI contains an identity
connective≡ and extends classical propositional logic CPC by the following identity
axioms:1
(Id1) ϕ ≡ ϕ
(Id2) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (ϕ↔ ψ)
(Id3) (ϕ ≡ ψ)→ (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ])2
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1Instead of scheme (Id3), Suszko considers a collection of other axioms. However, it can be shown that
that collection of axioms is equivalent with (Id3) modulo the rest (see [15]).
2Formula χ[x := ϕ] is the result of replacing every occurrence of variable x in χ by ϕ.
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ϕ ≡ ψ reads “ϕ and ψ have the same meaning (denotation, Bedeutung)”. While
(ϕ ≡ ψ) → (ϕ ↔ ψ) is a theorem, its converse (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) is not.
The latter says that ϕ and ψ have the same meaning whenever they have the same
truth value. This is essentially what Suszko called the Fregean Axiom. Logics without
Fregean Axiom are called non-Fregean logics. We regard the denotation of a formula as
a proposition and refer to the axioms (Id1)–(Id3) above as the axioms of propositional
identity. In particular, we refer to (Id3) as the Substitution Principle SP. It corresponds
to a general ontological principle as part of Leibniz’ law and is sometimes called in
the literature the Indiscernibility of Identicals: identical entities can be substituted by
each other in all contexts. Note that the modal systems S1–S5, introduced by C. Lewis
as logics of strict implication, satisfy (Id1)–(Id2) if we define propositional identity
ϕ ≡ ψ as strict equivalence (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). In [15, 16] we saw that
under this assumption, S3 is the weakest Lewis modal logic which also satisfies SP,
i.e. identity axiom (Id3). There is no known intuitive semantics for Lewis system
S1. Nevertheless, in [15] we were able to present an algebraic, non-Fregean-style
semantics for the slightly stronger system S1+SP which results from S1 by adding all
formulas of the form SP as theorems. Thus, the “Lewis-style” modal logics S1+SP,
S3, S4, S5 can be viewed as specific SCI-theories where propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ
is given as strict equivalence (ϕ ↔ ψ). These observations led to the development
of logic L [17] which extends the intuitionistic version of S1+SP by an axiom for
a disjunction property and the theorem tertium non datur. It turns out that L is a
conservative extension ofCPC and contains a copy of intuitionistic propositional logic
IPC by means of the embedding ϕ 7→ ϕ from IPC to L. That is, L is a modal logic
that combines IPC andCPC. L has a non-Fregean-style semantics given by a class of
specific Heyting algebras with a modal operator and a designated ultrafilter. However,
we are not able to provide a Kripke-style semantics for L.
This paper is organized as follows. First, we present axiomatization and algebraic
semantics of L5, the logic which results from L by adding the axioms of positive
and negative introspection. Many facts concerning logic L can be adopted. In the
following sections, we introduce Kripke-style semantics of L5 and prove equivalence
to algebraic semantics by showing that each L5-model corresponds to a Kripke frame
which satisfies exactly the same formulas, and vice-versa. Next, we generalize the
approach and study the parametrized versions of L5: for each intermediate logic I ,
we consider modal logic L5(I) which extends L5 in the sense that IPC is replaced
by I . The main result from [17] then can be re-formulated in the following way: ϕ
derives from Φ in logic I iff ϕ derives from Φ in L5(I), for propositional Φ∪{ϕ}.
We conclude that modal logic L5(I) is a conservative extension of CPC and contains
a copy of I by means of the embedding ϕ → ϕ from I to L5(I). That is, L5(I)
combines I and CPC in a similar way as L combines IPC and CPC. Our results
give rise to a simple method of deriving the algebraic and Kripke-style semantics of
some specific intermediate logics. Discussing the particular cases of the Logic of Here-
and-There, Go¨del-Dummett Logic and Jankov Logic, we are able to establish new
proofs, with some simplifications, of corresponding completeness results found in the
literature.
2
2 Modal logic L5
The language of modal propositional logic is inductively defined in the usual way over
a set of variables x0, x1, ..., logical connectives ∧, ∨, →, ⊥ and the modal operator
. Fm denotes the set of formulas, and Fm0 ⊆ Fm denotes the set of propositional
formulas, i.e. formulas without modal operator . We use the following abbreviations:
¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥
⊤ := ¬⊥
ϕ↔ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ) (“propositional identity = strict implication”)
Φ := {ψ | ψ ∈ Φ}
We consider the following axiom schemes:
(i) theorems of IPC3
(ii) ϕ→ ϕ
(iii) (ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(iv) (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ψ)
(v) ϕ→ ϕ
(vi) ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ
We call scheme (iv) the disjunction property. Schemes (v) and (vi) are the axioms
of positive and negative introspection, respectively. The inference rules are Modus
Ponens (MP) and Axiom Necessitation (AN) “If ϕ is an axiom, then infer ϕ.” Fur-
thermore, we add formulas of the form SP, i.e. (Id3) above, and tertium non datur
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ as theorems. Note that rule AN only applies to axioms, i.e. formulas of the
form (i)–(vi). We call the resulting deductive system L5 and write Φ ⊢L5 ϕ if formula
ϕ is derivable from Φ in L5. Recall that L [17] is L5 minus (v) and (vi). Also observe
that we obtain Lewis modal logic S1 if we drop (iv)–(vi), replace IPC by CPC in (i),
and replace scheme SP by the weaker rule of Substitutions of Proved Strict Equivalents
(SPSE) “If ϕ ≡ ψ is a theorem, then χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ] is a theorem” (see
e.g. [12] for a discussion about Lewis modal systems). In logic L5 as well as in L,
the modal operator, if restricted to propositional formulas, can be seen as a predicate
for provability (= intuitionistic truth). The axioms (ii)–(vi) then express principles of
constructive logic. For instance, scheme (iv) says that the existence of a proof of ϕ∨ψ
implies the existence of a proof of ϕ or a proof of ψ.4 This constructive principle can-
not be expressed in IPC itself.
As in logic L, the Deduction Theorem holds. Interestingly, the modal laws
• ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) (“There is exactly one necessary proposition.”)
• (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
3We mean all formulas which have the form of some IPC-theorem. For instance, x→ x has the form
ϕ→ ϕ and is therefore an axiom.
4The converse (ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (ϕ ∨ ψ) is derivable.
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• (ϕ ∧ ψ)↔ (ϕ ∧ψ)
• ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧(ψ → ϕ))↔ (ϕ↔ ψ)
are theorems. Derivations of the first two theorems can be found in [15]. The third
theorem derives similarly as in normal modal logics using modal law K (i.e. the second
theorem). Finally, the last theorem is a consequence of the third one. In particular,
propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by (ϕ↔ ψ).
3 Denotational semantics
In [17], we presented an algebraic, non-Fregean-style, semantics for logic L. We also
use the term denotational semantics because there is an explicitly given function that
maps formulas to their denotations/meanings as elements of a model-theoretic universe.
A model for L, which we call here a L-model, is a Heyting algebra
M = (M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f→, f∨, f∧, f)
with a designated ultrafilter TRUE ⊆ M on universe M and an operation f such
that for all m,m′,m′′ ∈M the following truth conditions are fulfilled (≤ is the lattice
ordering):
(i) f(m) ≤ m
(ii) f(f→(m,m′)) ≤ f→(f(f→(m′,m′′)), f(f→(m,m′′)))
(iii) f(f∨(m,m′)) ≤ f∨(f(m), f(m′))
(iv) f(m) ∈ TRUE ⇔ m = f⊤
We regard M as a propositional universe being TRUE ⊆ M the set of (classically)
true propositions. f⊤, f⊥ are the top and the bottom element of the Heyting algebra
and stand for intuitionistic truth and falsity, respectively.5
An important feature of a L-model is the disjunction property DP: for all m,m′ ∈
M , f∨(m,m
′) = f⊤ iff m = f⊤ or m′ = f⊤. Note that DP follows from truth condi-
tions (iii) and (iv) of a L-model and is not a general property of Heyting algebras. That
is, DP defines a specific subclass of Heyting algebras.
A L5-model is a L-model satisfying the following additional truth condition:
(v) For all m ∈M ,
f(m) =
{
f⊤, if m = f⊤
f⊥, else.
Note that truth condition (v) ensures soundness of the axioms of positive and nega-
tive introspection if we consider the definition of satisfaction below. Also observe that
5Note that we do not regard the elements of the underlying Heyting algebra as “generalized truth values”
as it is sometimes the case in the literature when algebraic semantics of IPC is discussed.
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in a L5-model, the truth conditions (i), (ii) and (iv) follow already from truth condition
(v).
Given a modelM, an assignment inM is a function γ : V →M that extends in the
canonical way to a function on Fm, i.e. γ(⊥) = f⊥, γ(⊤) = f⊤, γ(ϕ) = f(γ(ϕ)),
γ(ϕ ∗ ψ) = f∗(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)), for ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}. A L5-interpretation is a tuple (M, γ)
consisting of a L5-model and a corresponding assignment. The relation of satisfac-
tion is defined by (M, γ)  ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE and extends in the usual way to
sets of formulas. Finally, the relation of logical consequence in logic L5 is defined by
Φ L5 ϕ :⇔ (M, γ)  Φ implies (M, γ)  ϕ, for every L5-interpretation (M, γ).
The following is not hard to prove (see e.g. [15]):
(3.1) (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ).
That is, ϕ ≡ ψ is true iff ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition. This is precisely the
intended meaning of an identity connective in a denotational semantics, and that’s why
we refer to it as propositional identity.6
If (M, γ) is any interpretation and ϕ ↔ ψ is any theorem of CPC, such as
¬¬χ ↔ χ, then (M, γ)  ϕ ↔ ψ but not necessarily (M, γ)  ϕ ≡ ψ. That is,
Fregean Axiom (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) does not hold. This is in the very spirit of non-
Fregean logic: two formulas with the same truth value may have distinct denotations
(meanings). If we consider the preorder defined bym  m′ :⇔ f→(m,m′) ∈ TRUE ,
then the underlying Heyting algebra is a Boolean prealgebra with preorder , accord-
ing to Definition 3.1 in [16].7 In fact, the quotient algebra of the underlying Heyting
algebra modulo ultrafilter TRUE is the two-element Boolean algebra with TRUE as
top element. We proved in [16] that Boolean prealgebras and models of basic non-
Fregean logic SCI are essentially the same mathematical objects.
We call an interpretation (M, γ) surjective if γ : Fm→M is surjective, i.e. if for
each m ∈ M there is a ϕ ∈ Fm such that γ(ϕ) = m. Note that for any interpretation
(M, γ), the set γ(Fm) ⊆M is the universe M ′ of a submodelM′ ofM in the sense
that the operations of M restricted to M ′ = γ(Fm) form a Heyting algebra that sat-
isfies the truth conditions of a model M′. In fact, if m,m′ ∈ M ′ then f∧(m,m′) =
f∧(γ(ϕ), γ(ψ)) = γ(ϕ∧ψ) ∈M
′
, for some ϕ, ψ ∈ Fm, and similarly for the remain-
ing operations. Then it is clear that M ′ forms a Heyting algebra. It is also clear that
the truth conditions of a model hold for all subsets of the universe, particularly forM ′.
Furthermore, one easily recognizes that TRUE ∩γ(Fm) is an ultrafilter onM ′. Thus,
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ∩γ(Fm)⇔ (M′, γ)  ϕ. That is,
the interpretations (M, γ) and (M′, γ) satisfy exactly the same formulas. Therefore,
6When we say that a formula ϕ denotes a proposition m ∈M of a given modelM, then we are assuming
a given assignment γ with γ(ϕ) = m.
7Roughly speaking, a Boolean prealgebra is a structure that generalizes a Boolean algebra in the sense that
the underlying lattice ordering is no longer a partial ordering but a preorder, i.e., the axiom of antisymmetry
is not necessarily satisfied.
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we may assume in the following that all interpretations are surjective.
The completeness proof for L [17] extends straightforwardly to the case of logic
L5 and the corresponding class of L5-models:
Theorem 3.1 Logic L5 is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of all L5-models. That
is, for any set of formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ}, Φ ⊢L5 ϕ⇔ Φ L5 ϕ.
4 Kripke-style semantics for Logic L5
We were unable to find a Kripke semantics for logic L. The addition of axiom schemes
for positive and negative introspection (schemes (v) and (vi)) to L enables us to estab-
lish a natural Kripke-style semantics for the resulting logic L5. A L5-frame (W,R)
is given by a non-empty set W of worlds and a partial ordering R ⊆ W ×W , called
accessibility relation, with the property that there is a R-smallest element, which we
usually denote bywB (the bottom of the frame), and everyR-chain has an upper bound
in W . Note that Zorn’s Lemma implies that each w ∈ W accesses a R-maximal el-
ement. An assignment in a given L5-frame (W,R) is a function g : V → Pow(W )
satisfying the following monotonicity condition: For all w,w′ ∈ W and x ∈ V , if
wRw′ and w ∈ g(x), then w′ ∈ g(x). The satisfaction relation is defined as follows.
Suppose (W,R) is a L5-frame, g is an assignment in (W,R), and w ∈W . Then
(w, g) 2 ⊥
(w, g)  x :⇔ w ∈ g(x)
(w, g)  ϕ ∨ ψ :⇔ (w, g)  ϕ or (w, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ϕ ∧ ψ :⇔ (w, g)  ϕ and (w, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ϕ→ ψ :⇔ for all w′ ∈W with wRw′, (w′, g)  ϕ implies (w′, g)  ψ
(w, g)  ϕ :⇔ (wB , g)  ϕ
Note that semantics of logical connectives is defined as in usual intuitionistic Kripke
models. The next monotonicity result, which also holds in IPC, can be shown by in-
duction on formulas.
Lemma 4.1 If (W,R) is a L5-frame and g ∈ Pow(W )V is an assignment, then for
all w,w′ ∈W and all formulas ϕ: if (w, g)  ϕ and wRw′, then (w′, g)  ϕ.
Lemma 4.2 Let (W,R) be a L5-frame, w ∈ W and g an assignment. Then for any
formula ϕ,
• (w, g)  ϕ→ ϕ
• (w, g)  ¬ϕ→ ¬ϕ.
Proof. We leave the first claim as an exercise and outline the proof of the second
statement. (w, g)  ¬ϕ means that (w′, g) 2 ϕ, for all w′ ∈ W with wRw′. This
implies (w, g)  ¬ϕ implies (wB , g) 2 ϕ implies (w′, g) 2 ϕ, for all w′ ∈ W ,
implies (wB , g)  ¬ϕ implies (w, g)  ¬ϕ. Now, the claim follows. Q.E.D.
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5 Translation results
Of course, we expect that our algebraic and Kripke-style semantics for logic L5 are
equivalent in the sense that both lead to consequence relations which model precisely
the relation ⊢L5 of derivability. Instead of proving completeness of L5 w.r.t. Kripke se-
mantics directly, we show in this section in which way algebraic and Kripke semantics
translate into each other. The following basic facts about filters in Heyting algebras,
possibly known to the reader, will be useful.
Lemma 5.1 Let H be a Heyting algebra. Then:
(a) Every filter is the intersection of a set of prime filters.
(b) Let m1,m2 ∈ H and P be a prime filter. If for all prime filters P ′ ⊇ P , m1 ∈ P ′
implies m2 ∈ P ′, then f→(m1,m2) ∈ P .
(c) If U is an ultrafilter, then for all m,m′ ∈ H:
• m ∈ U or f¬(m) := f→(m, f⊥) ∈ U
• f→(m,m
′) ∈ U iff [m /∈ U or m′ ∈ U] iff f∨(f¬(m),m′) ∈ U
• U is a prime filter.
Proof. (a): Let F be a filter, and let X be the set of prime filters containing F . Since
every filter is contained in an ultrafilter which, by the last statement of the Lemma, is a
prime filter, X is non-empty. Obviously, F ⊆
⋂
X . Suppose there is m ∈
⋂
X r F .
By a standard application of Zorn’s Lemma, we derive the existence of an ultrafilter U
that contains F but not m. Then U ∈ X . This contradicts the hypothesis m ∈
⋂
X .
Thus,
⋂
X = F .
(b): Let m1,m2 ∈ H and P be a prime filter. We consider the quotient Heyting alge-
bra H′ of H modulo P . That is, the elements of H′ are the equivalence classes m of
m ∈ M modulo the equivalence relation ∼ defined by m ∼ m′ ⇔ [f→(m,m′) ∈ P
and f→(m′,m) ∈ P ]. Then one easily checks that P is the equivalence class of f⊤
modulo∼, and it is the top element f ′⊤ ofH′.
Claim1: Let m,m′ ∈ H . If m ∈ F ′ implies m′ ∈ F ′, for all filters F ′ of H′, then
m ≤′ m′, where ≤′ is the lattice ordering ofH′.
Proof of Claim1. Suppose m 
′ m′. Consider the filter G = {m′′ | m ≤′ m′′}. Then
m ∈ G and m′ /∈ G. We have proved the Claim.
Claim2: Let m,m′ ∈ H . If m ∈ F ′ implies m′ ∈ F ′, for all prime filters F ′ of H′,
then m ≤′ m′, where ≤′ is the lattice ordering ofH′.
Proof of Claim2. Claim2 follows from Claim1 together with (a).
Claim3: If F ′ is a (prime) filter of H′, then F = {m | m ∈ F ′} is a (prime) filter of
H extending P .
Proof of Claim3. Suppose m ∈ F and m ≤ m′. Then f→(m,m′) = f⊤. Thus,
f→(m,m′) = P = f
′
⊤. That is, f ′→(m,m′) = f ′⊤ and therefore m ≤′ m′. It follows
that m′ ∈ F ′ and m′ ∈ F . The remaining filter properties follow straightforwardly.
m ∈ P implies m = P = f ′⊤ ∈ F ′ implies m ∈ F . Thus, P ⊆ F and Claim3 holds
true.
Now suppose the premises of (b) are true. Let F ′ be any prime filter of H′ and
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m1 ∈ F
′
. Then, by Claim3, m1 ∈ F = {m | m ∈ F ′} and F is a prime filter
of H with P ⊆ F . By hypothesis of (b), m2 ∈ F . Thus, m2 ∈ F ′. By Claim2,
m1 ≤
′ m2. Then f→(m1,m2) = f ′⊤ = P . That is, f→(m1,m2) ∈ P .
(c) It is not hard to check that the quotient algebra ofHmodulo ultrafilter U is the two-
element Boolean algebra with top element f⊤ = U . Alternatively, one can show that
the map h : H → {f⊥, f⊤}, defined by h(m) = f⊤ :⇔ m ∈ U , is an homomorphism
of Heyting algebras. The assertions of the Lemma then follow by switching between
the elements of H and their corresponding congruence classes f⊤ and f⊥, i.e. the two
elements of the quotient algebra. Q.E.D.
There is a close connection between Heyting algebras and intuitionistic Kripke
frames which can be studied under different aspects (see e.g. [4, 1]). The next two
Theorems give an approach from the perspective of our semantical investigations. The
construction developed in the proof of Theorem 5.3 (cf. [Theorem 6.1 [16]]) will be
particularly useful for the method of determining Kripke semantics of some intermedi-
ate logics, as discussed in the last section.
Theorem 5.2 Suppose M is a L5-model and γ ∈ MV is an assignment. Then there
are a L5-frame (W,R), a maximal world wT ∈W and an assignment g ∈ Pow(W )V
such that for all formulas ϕ:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ (wT , g)  ϕ.
Proof. Let W be the set of all prime filters of the underlying Heyting algebra onM.
Then TRUE is a maximal element of W and wB := {f⊤} is the bottom world w.r.t.
the accessibility relation R which is given by set inclusion: wRw′ :⇔ w ⊆ w′. The
union of a chain of prime filters is again a prime filter. Thus, every chain in W has
an upper bound in W and (W,R) fulfills the requirements of a L5-frame. For a given
assignment β ∈ MV , define the function gβ : V → Pow(W ) by x 7→ {w ∈ W |
β(x) ∈ w}. Then wRw′ together with w ∈ gβ(x) implies w′ ∈ gβ(x). That is,
function gβ fulfills the monotonicity condition and is in fact an assignment in (W,R).
Claim: Let β ∈MV be any assignment in modelM. Then for all w ∈W :
(w, gβ)  ϕ⇔ β(ϕ) ∈ w.
We prove the Claim by induction on ϕ, simultaneously for all w ∈ W . In the basis case
ϕ = x ∈ V , the Claim follows from the definition of assignment gβ . Let ϕ = ψ ∨ χ.
Then
(w, gβ)  ψ ∨ χ⇔ (w, gβ)  ψ or (w, gβ)  χ
⇔ β(ψ) ∈ w or β(χ) ∈ w, by induction hypothesis
⇔ f∨(β(ψ), β(ψ)) ∈ w, since w is a prime filter
⇔ β(ϕ ∨ ψ) ∈ w, by definition of an assignment
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The case ϕ = ψ ∧χ follows similarly. Suppose ϕ = ψ → χ. Then, again by induction
hypothesis, we get
(w, gβ)  ψ → χ⇔ (w
′, gβ)  ψ implies (w′, gβ)  χ, for each w′ with wRw′
⇔ β(ψ) ∈ w′ implies β(χ) ∈ w′, for each w′ with wRw′
∗
⇔ f→(β(ψ), β(χ)) ∈ w
⇔ β(ψ → χ) ∈ w
The left-to-right direction of (*) follows from Lemma 5.1 (b). The right-to-left direc-
tion of (*) follows from the fact that f→(m,m′) is the relative pseudo-complement of
m w.r.t. m′ in the underlying lattice.
Finally, let ϕ = ψ. Then
(w, gβ)  ψ ⇔ (wB , gβ)  ψ
⇔ β(ψ) = f⊤, by induction hypothesis and the definition of wB
⇔ β(ψ) = f(β(ψ)) = f⊤, by truth conditions of a L5-model
In particular, (w, gβ)  ψ ⇒ β(ψ) ∈ w. On the other hand, β(ψ) ∈ w implies
β(ψ) = f(β(ψ)) 6= f⊥ because w is a filter and does not contain f⊥. By truth con-
dition (v), f(β(ψ)) = f⊤ and β(ψ) = f⊤. By the equivalences above, this implies
(w, gβ)  ψ. Hence, the Claim holds true. Then for the world wT = TRUE ∈ W
we have:
(wT , gγ)  ϕ
Claim
⇐⇒ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE ⇐⇒ (M, γ)  ϕ,
for any formula ϕ. Q.E.D.
Observe that truth condition (v) of a L5-model is crucial for the last case of the
induction step in the above proof. The proof does not work with any L-model not
satisfying truth condition (v).
Theorem 5.3 Let (W,R) be a L5-frame, g : V → Pow(W ) an assignment and wT ∈
W a maximal element of W . Then there are a L5-model M and an assignment
γ : V →M such that for all formulas ϕ:
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ (wT , g)  ϕ.
Proof. Suppose we are given a L5-frame (W,R) with a maximal world wT ∈ W
and an assignment g ∈ Pow(W )V . We define an equivalence relation ≈ on the set of
formulas by
ϕ ≈ ψ :⇔ (wB , g)  ϕ↔ ψ,
where wB is the bottom world. Thus, ϕ ≈ ψ iff (w, g)  ϕ ≡ ψ, for any world
w ∈ W . One easily checks that≈ respects the logical connectives as well as the modal
operator. Thus, ≈ is a congruence relation on the set of formulas. By ϕ we denote
the congruence class of a formula ϕ modulo ≈. Then we define the ingredients of
our L5-model by M := {ϕ | ϕ ∈ Fm}, TRUE := {ϕ | (wT , g)  ϕ}, f⊤ := ⊤,
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f⊥ := ⊥, f(ϕ) := ϕ and f∗(ϕ, ψ) := ϕ ∗ ψ, for ∗ ∈ {∨,∧,→}. Since ≈ is a
congruence relation, all these ingredients are well-defined. We must show that M =
(M,TRUE , f⊥, f⊤, f→, f∨, f∧, f) fulfills the conditions of a L5-model.
Claim: (M, f⊥, f⊤, f→, f∨, f∧) is a Heyting algebra.
Proof of the Claim. The class of Heyting algebras can be axiomatized by a set of
equations which correspond to theorems of IPC of the form ϕ ↔ ψ. Then at every
world in every Kripke model of intuitionistic logic, ϕ is true iff ψ is true. Since our
frames are in particular Kripke models of IPC, we get ϕ ≈ ψ for every theorem
ϕ ↔ ψ of IPC. Thus, ϕ = ψ and we have a Heyting algebra. It is clear by the
definitions that TRUE is an ultrafilter on M .
It remains to show that M satisfies the truth conditions (i)–(v) of a L5-model. Recall
that in any Heyting algebra: f→(m,m′) = f⊤ iff m ≤ m′. Also, we observe that
ϕ = ⊤ iff ϕ ≈ ⊤ iff (wB , g)  ϕ, where wB is the bottom world. Then, in order to
verify truth condition (i), it suffices to show that (wB , g)  ϕ → ϕ. This obviously
holds true. Similarly, one checks truth conditions (ii) and (iii). Finally, we check
truth conditions (iv) and (v). On the one hand, ϕ = f⊤ implies (wB, g)  ϕ implies
(wB , g)  ϕ implies f(ϕ) = f⊤. On the other hand, ϕ 6= f⊤ implies (w′, g) 2 ϕ,
for some w′ ∈ W , implies (wB , g) 2 ϕ implies (w, g) 2 ϕ, for all w ∈ W , implies
ϕ = f(ϕ) = f⊥. Thus, M is a L5-model. Now we let γ : V → M be the
assignment x 7→ x. By induction on formulas, γ(ϕ) = ϕ, for any ϕ ∈ Fm. Then
(M, γ)  ϕ⇔ γ(ϕ) = ϕ ∈ TRUE ⇔ (wT , g)  ϕ. Q.E.D.
Definition 5.4 Let Φ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of formulas. The relation of logical consequence
w.r.t. Kripke semantics is defined as follows. Φ KrL5 ϕ :⇔ for every L5-frame (W,R),
every assignment γ : V → Pow(W ) and maximal world wT ∈ W , (wT , γ)  Φ
implies (wT , γ)  ϕ.
So for Kripke semantics we have a pointwise (locally) defined consequence relation
which only considers the maximal points of a given frame. It follows by the definitions
that if (W,R) is a frame with maximal world wT , g is an assignment and ϕ, ψ are
formulas, then
(5.1) (wT , g)  ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ for all w ∈W : (w, g)  ϕ iff (w, g)  ψ.
Recall that in modal logic, a proposition is usually regarded as a set of possible worlds.
Then (5.1) says that ϕ ≡ ψ is true iff ϕ and ψ are satisfied at exactly the same worlds
iff ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition. That is, ϕ ≡ ψ actually stands for proposi-
tional identity. In this sense, (5.1) is the analogue to (3.1) in terms of possible worlds
semantics.
Corollary 5.5 (Completeness w.r.t. Kripke semantics) Let Φ ∪ {ϕ} be a set of for-
mulas. Then
Φ ⊢L5 ϕ⇔ Φ L5 ϕ⇔ Φ 
Kr
L5 ϕ.
Proof. The first equivalence is Theorem 3.1 above, which can be proved in the same
way as the corresponding completeness result for L presented in [17]. The second
equivalence follows by Theorems 5.2 and 5.3. Q.E.D.
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6 The parametrized logics L5(I)
In the following, we consider parametrized versions of logic L5. Let I be any in-
termediate logic. That is, I results from IPC by adding some axiom schemes that
correspond to theorems of CPC. We write Φ ⊢I ϕ if there is a derivation of ϕ from
Φ in I . By L5(I) we denote the logic which results from L5 by considering in item (i)
of the definition of L5 all theorems of I instead of only those of IPC. In particular,
L5 = L5(IPC). The notion of derivation Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ in L5(I) is defined as usual.
We saw in [17] thatL5 can be seen as a classical modal logic for the reasoning about
intuitionistic truth, i.e. provability. Analogously, L5(I) is a logic for the reasoning
about truth in the sense of I . In the limit case I = CPC, the modal operator then
becomes a predicate for classical truth in logic L5(I) itself:
Lemma 6.1 Let I = CPC. Then for all ϕ ∈ Fm, ⊢L5(I) ϕ↔ ϕ.
Proof. The formula ϕ → ϕ is an axiom. We show that ϕ → ϕ is a theorem of
L5(CPC). First, observe that tertium non datur ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ is not only a theorem but
also an axiom of L5(CPC). By rule AN and the axiom of the disjunction property,
ϕ∨¬ϕ is a theorem. Then ϕ→ ϕ∨¬ϕ is a theorem. By axiom (ii) and CPC,
(ϕ∧¬ϕ)→ (ϕ∧¬ϕ). Thus, ¬(ϕ∧¬ϕ) is a theorem. By CPC, that is equivalent
to ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ and to ϕ → ¬¬ϕ. Then we have ϕ → ((ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) ∧ ¬¬ϕ).
By distributivity, ϕ → ((ϕ ∧ ¬¬ϕ) ∨ (¬ϕ ∧ ¬¬ϕ)) which is equivalent to
ϕ → (ϕ ∧ ¬¬ϕ). Of course, (ϕ ∧ ¬¬ϕ) → ϕ is derivable. By transitivity,
ϕ→ ϕ is a theorem. Q.E.D.
Let M(L5(I)) be the class of those L5-models which evaluate all theorems of I
to the top element, under all assignments. That is, M ∈ M(L5(I)) iff M is a L5-
model and γ(ϕ) = f⊤ for all I-theorems ϕ ∈ Fm0 and for all γ ∈ MV .8 We refer to
the elements of M(L5(I)) as L5(I)-models. Analogously, we define a L5(I)-frame
as a L5-frame with the property that (wB , g)  ϕ for all theorems ϕ of I and all
assignments g, where wB is the bottom world. For a given set of formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ},
we write Φ L5(I) ϕ if (M, γ)  Φ implies (M, γ)  ϕ, for all M ∈ M(L5(I)) and
all assignments γ in M. Analogously, we define Φ Kr
L5(I) ϕ as in Definition 5.4, but
with L5(I)-frames instead of all L5-frames. Now observe that Theorem 5.2 assigns
to each L5(I)-model M a L5(I)-frame (W,R). In fact, if ϕ is a theorem of I , then
(M, γ)  ϕ. By Theorem 5.2, (wT , g)  ϕ. This means (wB , g)  ϕ. On the
other hand, Theorem 5.3 assigns to each L5(I)-frame (W,R) a L5(I)-modelM. For
if ϕ is an I-theorem, then (wB , g)  ϕ. Thus, (wT , g)  ϕ, with maximal world wT .
Then by Theorem 5.3, (M, γ)  ϕ. That is, γ(ϕ) = f⊤. We conclude:
Corollary 6.2 For any set Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm:
Φ L5(I) ϕ⇔ Φ 
Kr
L5(I) ϕ.
8By SP, such a model evaluates not only I-theorems to the top element but also any formula ϕ ∈ Fm
which has the form of an I-theorem and possibly contains the modal operator .
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By induction on derivations, we may prove soundness of L5(I) w.r.t. the semantics
generated by the class of all L5(I)-models:
(6.1) Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ⇒ Φ L5(I) ϕ.
Now supposeΦ∪{ϕ} ⊆ Fm0, i.e. we are given propositional formulas. As in [Lemma
2.3 [17]], one shows by induction on derivations that Φ ⊢I ϕ implies Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ.
On the other hand, if Φ 0I ϕ, then, in a similar way as in the proof of [Theorem 5.1
[17]] (in fact, it suffices to replace IPC with I in that proof), we may find a model
M ∈ M(L5(I)) and an assignment γ such that (M, γ)  Φ and (M, γ) 2 ϕ.
That is, Φ 1L5(I) ϕ. By soundness, Φ 0L5(I) ϕ. We have established the
following two results for propositional Φ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Fm0:
Φ ⊢I ϕ⇔ Φ L5(I) ϕ
Φ ⊢I ϕ⇔ Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ.
(6.2)
Note that we did not need completeness to establish (6.2). Nevertheless, complete-
ness of L5(I) can be shown in a similar way as completeness of L [17]. Thus, the
converse of (6.1) above holds true, too. The second statement of (6.2) is a generaliza-
tion of the Main Theorem of [17] with I instead of IPC and L5(I) instead of L. What
does that result mean? It is clear that Φ ⊢CLC ϕ implies Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ (recall that L5(I)
contains all classical theorems). Now suppose Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ, for propositional Φ ∪ {ϕ}.
By soundness, Φ L5(I) ϕ. In particular, if the two-element Boolean algebra (which,
of course, is a L5(I)-model) satisfies Φ, under a given assignment, then it also satisfies
ϕ. This means that ϕ follows from Φ in CPC. Thus, Φ ⊢CPC ϕ ⇔ Φ ⊢L5(I) ϕ,
for propositional formulas Φ ∪ {ϕ}. This, together with the second statement of (6.2),
shows that L5(I) can be seen as a combination of intermediate logic I and CPC. In
particular, L5(I) is a conservative extension of CPC, and L5(I) contains a copy of I
in the following sense: ⊢I ϕ⇔ ⊢L5(I) ϕ, for propositional ϕ ∈ Fm0.
Recall that ϕ↔ (ϕ ≡ ⊤) is a theorem of L and of L5(I). For a set of formulas
Φ, we write Φ ≡ ⊤ for the set of equations {ψ ≡ ⊤ | ψ ∈ Φ}. Then the first statement
of (6.2) can be expressed in the following way. For propositional Φ ∪ {ϕ}:
(6.3) Φ ⊢I ϕ⇔ (Φ ≡ ⊤) L5(I) (ϕ ≡ ⊤).
Before we discuss (6.3), we define the reduct of a L5-model (or a L-model) as the
underlying Heyting algebra. Since a model has an ultrafilter, its reduct is a non-trivial
Heyting algebra, i.e. it has at least two elements f⊥ 6= f⊤. Moreover, the reduct is a
Heyting algebra with disjunction property DP. On the other hand, one easily shows that
any non-trivial Heyting algebra with DP expands to a L5-model. In fact, the resulting
L5-model only depends on the actual choice of the designated ultrafilter TRUE . Note
that the operation f is uniquely determined in a L5-model.
These considerations show that we can interpret (6.3) in the following way.
Φ ⊢I ϕ iff for the reduct of any L5(I)-model and any assignment, if all formulas of Φ
denote the top element, then ϕ denotes the top element.
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That is, we get a concept of logical consequence defined in terms of Heyting al-
gebras. This corresponds to the usual notion of logical consequence w.r.t. algebraic
semantics for IPC found in the literature. However, whereas the usual notion involves
all Heyting algebras, we see here that it is enough to consider Heyting algebras with
DP. This observation will play a crucial role in the next section.
How can we interpret (6.3) under Kripke semantics? By Corollary 6.2, we have
Φ ⊢I ϕ ⇔ (Φ ≡ ⊤) 
Kr
L5(I) (ϕ ≡ ⊤). By definition, this means that whenever wT
is a maximal world of a L5(I)-frame and g is any assignment, then (wT , g)  Φ ≡ ⊤
implies (wT , g)  ϕ ≡ ⊤. But (wT , g)  Φ ≡ ⊤ means (wB , g)  ψ ↔ ⊤ for all
ψ ∈ Φ, where wB is the bottom world. (wB , g)  ψ ↔ ⊤ implies (wB , g)  ψ.
Consequently, we may express (6.3) in the following way.
(6.4) Φ ⊢I ϕ⇔ if (wB , g)  Φ then (wB , g)  ϕ,
whenever wB is the bottom world of a L5(I)-frame and g is any assignment.
Note that we have now two frame-based locally defined logical consequence re-
lations. The first one, based on Definition 5.4, models logical consequence in the
parametrized modal logics L5(I) and involves only the maximal worlds of a given
frame. The second one, given in (6.4), models consequence in intermediate logics I
and involves the smallest world of a given frame. This is the usual definition of logical
consequence based on intuitionistic Kripke frames.
7 A simple method for determining algebraic and Kripke
semantics of some intermediate logics
The results from the preceding section give rise to a simple method for determining
algebraic and Kripke-style semantics of some specific intermediate logics. The method
essentially relies on the fact that it suffices to work with Heyting algebras having DP.
If intermediate logic I is given as I = IPC + ϕ1 + ... + ϕn with disjunctive and not
too complicated formulas ϕi, then we may hope that our method is applicable. In the
following, we illustrate the method discussing some specific examples with n = 1. We
obtain simple proofs of already known completeness results.
7.1 The Logic of Here-and-There HT
The Logic of Here-and-There (HT ) was originally introduced by Heyting [9] as a
three-valued logic for the purpose of showing that IPC is strictly weaker than CPC.
It reappeared in [6] where Go¨del proved that IPC cannot be characterized by a finite
matrix of truth values. Go¨del also showed that HT is the strongest intermediate logic
weaker than CPC. Semantically, HT can also be described by Heyting algebras with
at most three elements and by Kripke frames with at most two worlds (the world of
“here” and the world of “there”). HT is also known as Smetanich Logic. The im-
portance of HT for logic programming under the stable semantics paradigma [5] was
discovered by D. Pearce [19, 20]. Moreover, results of Lifschitz, Pearce and Valverde
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[18] show thatHT can be seen as an adequate logic for reasoning with logic programs.
Two logic programs are said to be equivalent if they have the same answer sets (stable
models). This concept of equivalence, however, is not context independent. In [18],
two logic programs P1 and P2 are said to be strongly equivalent if for any program P ,
the programs P1 ∪ P and P2 ∪ P are equivalent. In this sense, the concept of strong
equivalence is independent of the actual context in which logic programs are embed-
ded. The authors show that two logic programs are strongly equivalent iff they are
equivalent as formulas in HT . Observe now that by (6.2) above, for any propositional
formulas ϕ, ψ:
⊢HT ϕ↔ ψ if and only if ⊢L5(HT ) ϕ ≡ ψ.
That is, the relation of propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ, which is defined as strict equiv-
alence (ϕ ↔ ψ) in the sense of Lewis’ modal logics, reads as strong equivalence
of corresponding logic programs. Note that the above discussed context independence
of strong equivalence, defined in [18], is in some sense expressed by theorem SP:
(ϕ ≡ ψ) → (χ[x := ϕ] ≡ χ[x := ψ]), our representation of the principle of Indis-
cernibility of Identicals, shortly discussed in the introductory part.
Hosoi [11] proved that Kripke semantics ofHT can be axiomatized by IPC+[ϕ∨
(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ ¬ψ]. Recently, a more direct proof was found by Harrison et al. [8].
In the following, we illustrate our method deriving algebraic and Kripke seman-
tics directly from Hosoi’s axiomatization. This results in a further proof of Hosoi’s
theorem.
By (6.3), HT is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Heyting algebras which
are reducts of L5(HT )-models. We will characterize those reducts by their algebraic
structure. By (6.3), L5(HT ) (x ∨ (x → y) ∨ ¬x) ≡ ⊤. Let H be the reduct of a
L5(HT )-model and suppose that m,m′ are elements of H distinct from the top and
the bottom. We consider an assignment γ with γ(x) = m and γ(y) = m′. Then
γ(x ∨ (x → y) ∨ ¬y) = γ(⊤) = f⊤. By DP, γ(x) = f⊤ or γ(x → y) = f⊤ or
γ(¬y) = f⊤. By hypothesis, γ(x) 6= f⊤ and γ(¬y) = γ(y → ⊥) 6= f⊤. Hence,
γ(x → y) = f→(m,m
′) = f⊤. That is, m ≤ m′. Now we consider an assignment β
with β(x) = m′ and β(y) = m and conclude in a similar way that m′ ≤ m. Hence,
m = m′ andH has exactly three elements: m, f⊤ and f⊥. One also easily checks that
a reduct may have only two elements: f⊤ and f⊥. We have shown that the reduct of
any L5(HT )-model is a Heyting algebra with at most three elements. Now suppose
we are given a non-trivial Heyting algebra with at most three elements. Note that such
an algebra is a linearly ordered: f⊥ ≤ m ≤ f⊤. Then it is clear that Hosoi’s axiom
x ∨ (x → y) ∨ ¬y is satisfied, under all assignments. Hence, the reducts of L5(HT )-
models are precisely the non-trivial Heyting algebras with at most three elements, and
HT is sound and complete w.r.t. that class of algebras.
There is exactly one Heyting algebra with three elements, and the unique Heyting
algebra with two-elements is the two-element Boolean algebra (up to isomorphisms).
Obviously, the Boolean algebra has only one (prime) filter, and the three-element Heyt-
ing algebra has exactly two (prime) filters which are linearly ordered by inclusion.
By Theorem 5.2, this results in frames with at most two worlds wB, wT (possibly
wB = wT ). On the other hand, suppose we are given a frame with at most two worlds
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wT , wB . Then one verifies that ϕ ≈ ψ ⇔ (wB , g)  ϕ ↔ ψ defines an equivalence
relation with at most three classes ⊤, ⊥ and ϕ, where ϕ is any formula false at the
bottom world and true at the top world. According to the proof of Theorem 5.3, this
results in a L5-model with at most three elements, i.e. a L5(HT )-model. Hence, HT
is sound and complete w.r.t. Kripke semantics generated by frames with at most two
worlds. Q.E.D.
7.2 Go¨del-Dummett Logic G
M. Dummett [3] considers the logic IPC + [(ϕ → ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ)] and shows its
completeness w.r.t. algebraic semantics given by all linearly ordered Heyting algebras.
The logic is known as Go¨del-Dummett Logic G because of its relations to Go¨del’s n-
valued logics studied in [6]. J. v. Plato [21] observed that that logic was introduced by
T. Skolem already in 1913. P. Ha´jek [7] studies G as one of the important Fuzzy Logic
systems which are given as extensions of Ha´jek’s basic logic BL.
A relatively simple proof of Dummett’s original completeness theorem is found by
A. Horn [10]. Horn’s proof is based on the fact that a Heyting algebra H validates
Dummett’s axiom iffH is a subalgebra of a direct product of linearly ordered Heyting
algebras. A similar proof, in terms of BL-algebras, is contained in [7]. In the follow-
ing, we prove Dummett’s theorem with our method.
By (6.3), G is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Heyting algebras wich are
reducts of L5(G)-models. Our goal is to characterize those algebras by their specific
structure. By (6.3), L5(G) ((x → y) ∨ (y → x)) ≡ ⊤. Then for any given L5(G)-
model and assignment γ, γ((x → y) ∨ (y → x)) = f⊤. By DP, γ(x → y) = f⊤
or γ(y → x) = f⊤. That is, γ(x) ≤ γ(y) or γ(y) ≤ γ(x). This holds for all
assignments. Thus, the universe of the model is linearly ordered. We have proved that
the reduct of every L5(G)-model is a linearly ordered Heyting algebra. On the other
hand, it is clear that every linearly ordered Heyting algebra evaluates Dummett’s axiom
(x → y) ∨ (y → x) to the top element, under all assignments. We conclude that the
class of L5(G) reducts is exactly the class of all non-trivial linearly ordered Heyting
algebras. Hence, G is sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics generated by that class
of algebras.
Note that logic HT axiomatizes a special class of linearly ordered Heyting alge-
bras, namely those with at most three elements. Consequently, G is a sublogic of
HT . What can be said about the prime filters of a linearly ordered Heyting alge-
bra? We may consider such an universe as the closed interval [f⊥, f⊤] which is lin-
early ordered by the underlying lattice ordering. The supremum (infimum) of two
elements m,m′ equals m or m′. Then it is clear that the filters are precisely the
unions of closed intervals [m, f⊤] with m > f⊥. In particular, all filters are prime,
and they are linearly ordered by inclusion (observe that the unique ultrafilter is the set
(f⊥, f⊤] =
⋃
m 6=f⊥
[m, f⊤]). By Theorem 5.2, this results in linearly ordered frames.
Now suppose we are given a frame (W,R) which is a linear ordering. Again, we
consider the equivalence relation ϕ ≈ ψ ⇔ (wB , g)  ϕ ↔ ψ from the proof of
Theorem 5.3. For two elements ϕ, ψ of the resulting L5-model, we have ϕ ≤ ψ ⇔
f→(ϕ, ψ) = f⊤ ⇔ ϕ→ ψ = ⊤ ⇔ (wB , g)  ϕ → ψ. Since the worlds are linearly
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ordered and wB is the bottom world, one easily checks that (wB , g) 2 ϕ→ ψ implies
(wB , g)  ψ → ϕ. Then by the above equivalences, ϕ  ψ implies ψ ≤ ϕ. That
is, the resulting L5-model is linearly ordered, i.e. it is a L5(G)-model. Consequently,
Kripke semantics of logic G is given by the class of linearly ordered frames. Q.E.D.
7.3 Jankov Logic KC
The logic axiomatized by IPC +¬ϕ ∨¬¬ϕ was introduced by V. A. Jankov [14] and
is known as Jankov Logic,KC or the Logic of the Weak Law of the Excluded Middle.
Jankov proved its soundness and completeness w.r.t. finite rooted Kripke frames with
a single maximal world. D. de Jongh and L. Hendriks [13] showed that KC is the
weakest intermediate logic for which strongly equivalent logic programs, in a language
allowing negations, are logically equivalent. In the following, we show how algebraic
and Kripke-style semantics of KC derives from Jankov’s axiomatization using our
general method.
By (6.3), KC is sound and complete w.r.t. the class of Heyting algebras which are
reducts of L5(KC)-models. We aim at a characterization of those algebras. For any
reduct of a L5(KC)-model and any assignment γ, we have γ(¬x ∨ ¬¬x) = f⊤. By
DP, γ(¬x) = f⊤ or γ(¬¬x) = f⊤. This is equivalent to the condition:
(7.1) γ(x) = f⊥ or γ(x→ ⊥) = f→(γ(x), f⊥) = f⊥.
Recall that the relative pseudo-complement f→(γ(x), f⊥) of γ(x) w.r.t. f⊥ is the
greatest element m such that f∧(γ(x),m) ≤ f⊥. Then, with (7.1), γ(x) > f⊥ implies
f→(γ(x), f⊥) = f⊥ implies f∧(γ(x),m′) > f⊥, for all m′ > f⊥. This holds for
all assignments γ. We conclude that the reduct of any L5(KC)-model is a non-trivial
Heyting algebra with DP and the following specific property. For all elements m,m′:
(7.2) m > f⊥ and m′ > f⊥ ⇒ f∧(m,m′) > f⊥.
Let us refer to such Heyting algebras as KC-algebras. In order to characterize
the class of reducts of L5(KC)-models as precisely the class of KC-algebras, it re-
mains to show that every KC-algebra is the reduct of a L5(KC)-model, i.e. eval-
uates the formula ¬x ∨ ¬¬x to the top element, under any assignment. Suppose
we are given a KC-algebra and an assignment γ with γ(¬x ∨ ¬¬x) 6= f⊤. Then
γ(¬x) = γ(x → ⊥) = f→(γ(x), f⊥) 6= f⊤ and γ(¬¬x) = γ(¬x → ⊥) =
f→(γ(¬x), f⊥)) 6= f⊤. Thus, γ(x) > f⊥ and γ(¬x) = f→(γ(x), f⊥) > f⊥. How-
ever, f∧(γ(x), f→(γ(x), f⊥)) = f⊥, as in every Heyting algebra. This contradicts the
property of aKC-algebra, condition (7.2) above. Hence, γ(¬x∨¬¬x) = f⊤. We have
proved that the reducts of L5(KC)-algebras are precisely the KC algebras. Hence,
Jankov logic is sound and complete w.r.t. the semantics given by the class of KC-
algebras. Note that the models of Go¨del-Dummett Logic G are special KC-algebras.
Hence, KC ⊆ G ⊆ HT .
Let us specify the corresponding Kripke semantics. We claim that each KC-
algebra has exactly one ultrafilter. Suppose there are two ultrafilters U 6= U ′. Then
there is some m ∈ U r U ′. By Lemma 5.1, f¬(m) := f→(m, f⊥) ∈ U ′. Because
m and f¬(m) belong to filters, they are greater than the bottom element. However,
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their infimum equals the bottom. This contradicts the specific property (7.2) of a KC-
algebra. Thus, a KC-algebra has exactly one ultrafilter. By Theorem 5.2, this results
in frames with a single maximal world. Now suppose we are given a frame with a sin-
gle maximal world wT . For a given assignment g, we consider again the equivalence
class ≈ on Fm defined in the proof of Theorem 5.3. We must show that the resulting
L5-model is a L5(KC)-model, i.e. has the property (7.2) of a KC-algebra. So let
ϕ 6= ⊥ and ψ 6= ⊥ be two elements greater than the bottom. Since neither ϕ ≈ ⊥
nor ψ ≈ ⊥, there are worlds w and w′ with (w, g)  ϕ and (w′, g)  ψ. Both worlds
must access the same maximal world because there is only one, namely wT . Then, by
monotonicity, (wT , g)  ϕ∧ψ. That is, f∧(ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ∧ ψ 6= ⊥ = f⊥, and (7.2) is ful-
filled. Hence, the resulting Heyting algebra is a KC-algebra. We conclude that Kripke
semantics for KC is given by all frames with a single maximal world. It is known that
IPC is complete w.r.t. the class of all finite rooted Kripke models. Since IPC ⊆ KC,
it suffices to consider finite frames with a single maximal world as Kripke semantics
for Jankov Logic. Q.E.D.
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